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We present the outcome of an idea market run for one of GE Energy's sub-
businesses in July and August of 2006.  GE Energy used this market to elicit and 
rank-order technology and product ideas from across the sub-business. In this 
experiment, we examine the behavior of traders that have submitted the ideas on the 
market and their influence on the market's outcome. An idea’s submitter is clearly 
motivated to have his idea valued highly by the market, both by the funding given to 
the top idea as well as smaller prizes given to the top three ideas. In general, founders 
tended to buy their suggested ideas at prices above the volume-weighted-average-
price (VWAP) in significant volumes. We discuss the implications and mitigation 
strategies. A survey of market participants yielded mixed results regarding the 
market's effectiveness at ranking ideas but very positive results regarding the quality 
of ideas proposed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
General Electric has been experimenting with idea markets for the 
purposes of collaborative brainstorming and idea ranking.  Our specific 
implementation of idea markets is called Imagination Markets.1   
Idea markets, also called preference markets, are a special form of 
prediction markets specifically designed to aggregate preferences; participants 
buy and sell securities based on their preferences.  Unlike prediction markets, 
the underlying objective value of the securities is not known at the close of the 
market.  Instead, the securities' value is based on the opinions of the 
participants.  Chan, et al. has done important work on idea markets. Chan 
demonstrates that idea markets used to aggregate opinions are consistent with 
opinions collected via web surveys. He asserts that markets may improve 
upon traditional survey methods by encouraging greater honesty from the 
participants, providing participants with valuable feedback from other 
participants, and offering participants “the joy of competitive play.”3
GE’s Imagination Markets help us answer tough business questions such 
as “What new technology ideas should we be investing in?” and “What new 
products should we be developing?” Market participants can submit their own 
ideas for entry into the market, and they can buy and sell shares of any idea in 
the market based on how well they believe the idea will contribute to the 
market's (and the GE business's) objectives. Example objectives include 
contributing the most to growth or developing new revenue streams.  At the 
end of the market, shares are valued using the volume weighted average price 
over the last 5 days of trading.   
GE's interest in idea markets stem from our belief that innovative new 
product and service ideas can come from anywhere within an organization. 
Since innovation is a key component of General Electric, the generation of 
new ideas is one of the first steps in the planning of research projects and 
allocation of research funding.  Similar to most companies, GE utilizes a 
variety of methods to generate and down-select new ideas.  While the process 
varies from business to business, new ideas are typically generated by 
traditional means, including suggestion boxes and brainstorming sessions.  
These traditional means of encouraging new ideas within businesses have 
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considerable limitations.  Suggestion boxes often go unused because 
contributors receive little or no feedback about their idea or visibility into 
others' ideas.  Brainstorming sessions are often infeasible for soliciting ideas 
from large, globally distributed teams with potentially thousands of 
contributors.  A small team, usually management, through their expert 
evaluation of the ideas' viability, typically performs the ranking and down-
selection of ideas.  By extending a traditional information market to allow 
participants to contribute ideas throughout the course of the market, we have 
created a tool that leverages the participants' expertise to identify ideas, as 
well as to effectively rank them.  This tool was developed to augment the 
existing methods for idea generation and ranking, providing another data 
point in the overall idea generation and ranking process. 
A discussion of our initial Imagination Market, justification for design 
choices, and early results are presented in LaComb, Barnett, and Pan (2007).  
This paper presents an idea market executed in 2006 for a sub-business of 
GE's Energy business and was the fourth of ten Imagination Markets we have 
run thus far. In this market, we changed several design aspects from our 
original Imagination Market.  Specifically, we removed short selling since 
earlier participants had found it to be confusing.  Instead, in this market, we 
allocated initial shares of every idea to every participant at the time the idea 
entered the market.  We also changed our original design to value the 
portfolio during the course of the market based on the volume-weighted 
average price of the last five days of trading, instead of the last trading price.  
Further information regarding these design changes are outlined in the section 
below titled "Design of the Market and Securities".  
Our objectives for the Imagination Market technology are to: 1) generate 
more ideas than are obtained through other traditional mechanisms, 2) make 
everyone within the organization a part of the idea generation process, and 3) 
identify the best idea. The ideas selected through the Imagination Market 
process may be directly funded or the outcome of the Imagination Market 
may be another data point in the ranking and down-selection process.  
In earlier markets, we noticed the tendency of the individual who 
submitted an idea to be over-exuberant in the trading of their own idea.  We 
analyze the behavior of the idea submitter in the trading of his own idea and 
discuss impact and mitigation strategies.  
 
 
DESIGN OF THE MARKET AND SECURITIES 
 
There are many choices for market design. Duration, participants, 
incentives, anonymity, and financial structure are just a few of the many  
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Participant community All salaried employees in the US and Europe in one of GE 
Energy's sub-business were invited to participate.  Those 
invited did not participate in earlier markets.   
Initial seed securities The market was seeded with eight ideas generated before the 
market opened so there would be securities to trade at the 
start of the market. 
Addition of new ideas 
(securities)  
We accepted new ideas for the first two weeks of the three-
week market.  A cross-functional team from the business 
reviewed ideas and chose which ones to include in the market 
based on how well they fit the idea criteria presented to 
traders prior to market start.  Ideas were also selected to 
represent a wide breadth of business areas in the market. 
Members of the review committee did not otherwise 
participate in the market.   
Initial allocation of shares for 
each security 
Each participant was given 15 shares of each security at no 
cost. Participants also received $3000 in play money to 
invest.  At the end of each week, registered participants 
received an additional $1000 play money with which to trade. 
This was unlike the design of our first Imagination market, 
where participants were given only cash and were allowed to 
take short positions on securities.  We removed the short 
selling option because many traders were confused by the 
short selling implementation.  We then chose to provide 
everyone with initial shares, which they could sell to express 
their opinion that the value of the security was lower than the 
current price. 
Pricing of shares In the creation of limit orders, traders were allowed to set any 
price they wanted from 1 to 99 dollars per share.  Ideas’ 
“current” prices were simply their last traded price.  But 
unlike the design of our first Imagination Market, we used the 
volume-weighted average price from the last five trading days 
when calculating an ideas’ relative worth in the portfolio 
during the course of the market.  Use of the last trading price 
as the method of valuing securities throughout the course of 
the market had two limitations: 1) it resulted in a tendency of 
traders to trade a small number of shares in order to see a 
short-term improvement in their portfolio value; 2) valuing 
based on the last trading price did not accurately reflect the 
final payout, which was based on the volume weighted 
average price.  
Final payout to participants 
(and determination of the best 
idea)  
The best idea was the security with the highest volume-
weighted average price (VWAP) during the 5 business days 
prior to market close.  
Market duration: 2 weeks, 5 
days 
We did not publicize a specific market close date to mitigate 
the risk of manipulation and tournament behavior as the close 
date approached. 




Anonymity  Whether suggesting a new idea or trading, all participants 
were only known to each other through their trader ids when 
interacting through the Imagination Market application. This 
allowed traders to express their true opinion about ideas 
without fear of retribution from other participants. We did not 
forbid traders from disclosing their identity outside of the 
market. 
Discussion forums available 
for sharing information 
We wanted participants to share opinions about the securities 
in an online format so we provided a discussion forum for 
each security. 
Incentive for best idea: 
research funding 
The reward for the best idea was $50,000 of research funding 
to pursue the idea.  While the research funding represents a 
significant dollar amount, unlike the other incentives, this is 
money that is not directly provided to the employee.  Instead 
it is allocated as internal time and resources that can be spent 
on the idea's development.   
An Apple iPod4 was also awarded for the top idea.1 Second 




The top trader (based on portfolio value) received an Apple 
iPod. The second place trader received a $100 gift card. The 
third received a $50 gift card. Although performance-based 
rewards have been proven to encourage tournament behavior, 
we felt that these incentives were necessary to encourage 
participation.5    
Lottery incentive Two $50 gift cards were awarded by random drawing 
(lottery). Lottery entries were created for each trade so the 
more a participant traded, the better chances they would have.   
The inclusion of this lottery incentive may mitigate the risk of 
tournament behavior.  However, in future markets we may 
wish to include a lottery aspect to the performance based 
incentives by allocating a number of lottery tickets to the 
trader or idea in proportion to the performance of the 
trader/idea.  However, since all traders face the same 
incentives on this market (even if they are in a tournament 
which encourages risk-seeking trading) our comparison of 
founder/non-founder results will still be insightful. 
Table 1: Market Design 
market attributes to consider. A thorough discussion and justification of our 
design choices is presented in LaComb, Barnett, and Pan (2007).   
Tabel 1 describes some of our Imagination Market design decisions along 
with brief explanations of why the design choice was employed.  In cases 
where specific design choices have changed since our first implementation, 
the reason for the change is provided. 
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Participants were given a set of criteria against which to evaluate the 
market ideas. We asked participants to set the price at which they were willing 
to buy or sell shares (minimum 1 dollar per share, maximum 99 dollars per 
share) based on how closely the idea fit the criteria. This allowed participants 
to not only evaluate ideas in a similar manner to each other, but to use criteria 
that management would ordinarily use to evaluate ideas. The criteria were: 
 
• Ideas our customers will value, and  
• Ideas that will produce the best return on investment, and 






The sub-business was self selected based on their own knowledge of the 
Imagination Market program from GE’s Global Research Organization.  All 
salaried employees within the GE Energy sub-business were invited to 
participate.  The sub-business is relatively small in size compared to the 
overall organization, which made coordination of the market somewhat easier.  
On the other hand, the sub-business is large enough and responsible for a 
fairly large breadth of product lines in the Energy industry to provide a 
relatively diverse base of participants.  Of the 1,236 employees invited to 
participate, 186 (15%) registered for the market and 110 (9%) made trades.  
The trader population was reasonably diverse and represented all functional 
groups within the business, roughly in proportion with the functional and 
geographic distribution of the business as a whole. Traders were located in 
multiple locations across North America and Europe.    
Forty of the traders served in Engineering roles and accounted for 25% of 
the total trade volume. The balance of the trading population served in roles 
such as project management, finance, marketing, sales, legal and human 
resources.  Nineteen of the traders were in management positions and 
accounted for 6.5% of total trade volume.  Total daily participation rates are 
shown in Figure 1. 
Eight ideas were seeded in the market in order to get trading started.  
During the first two weeks of the market, we invited participants to suggest 
new ideas to be added as securities.  Fifty-four new ideas were submitted; 
each idea was considered for entry into the market by a cross-functional 
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review team. If the review team approved the idea, it was added to the market 
and trading could begin immediately.   
Thirty-two new ideas were approved and placed into the market for 
trading during the first two weeks, resulting in a total of forty ideas on the 
market.  The cross-functional review team screened out twenty-two suggested 
ideas.  Figure 2 illustrates the points in the market at which new securities 



















































































































Active Traders Total Active Traders Volume By Day Total Volume
 
Figure 1: Participation Throughout the Market 
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Registered Users Total Active Traders Securities Added
 
Figure 2: Security versus Trader Totals 
b. Security Ranking 
The final market results are shown in Table 2. Final price, total volume 
traded, and the number of individual traders who bought or sold the security 
are shown. The Initial Seed column indicates whether the idea was present at 
the start of the market (as indicated by a "Y").  Through the course of the 
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Table 2: Market Results - All traded ideas and final prices 
Figure 3 displays the daily volume weighted average price (VWAP) for 
the top 5 securities based on VWAP over the last five days of the market.  
Although there were considerable fluctuations in pricing even at the end of the 
market, most of the top priced securities stayed consistently high throughout 
the course of the market.  Most noteworthy, the two securities that tied for 
first place were in stiff competition throughout the duration of the market. 
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Daily Volume Weighted Average Price (Daily VWAP) 
Ticker 
 
Figure 3: Daily volume weighted average price for each idea on the market 
 
c. Idea Springboarding 
The market mechanism allowed for a relatively large number of promising 
ideas to be generated in a relatively short time period.  Further, a springboard 
effect was noted as ideas in the market tended to trigger submissions of 
related ideas that, in many cases, built upon the original submissions.  Figure 
4 shows a qualitative grouping of the ideas in the market by similarity.  This 
grouping represents a subjective assessment by the product line management 
function of the sub-business, and no distance measures are meant to be 
conveyed in this graph.  Ideas contained within the same circle represent 
variations of the same product line (for example, a red car versus a blue car).  
Ideas representing similar, but different product lines are connected by a 
dotted line, but not encircled (for example, a red sedan may be connected to a 
red van, but would not be connected to an airplane). 
Clear winners were often selected from the similar groupings (shown in 
figure 4).  For example, of the cluster involving securities C, X, DD, I, 
security C was the market’s favorite, ending with a price of $50 compared to 
the others ending in the $30s.  Further C had a negative correlation with each 
of the ideas as the market tended to buy more of C as X, DD and I were sold.  
Similar market reactions were seen in the JJ, LL, M, BB, O, W, KK cluster; 
the V, E, II cluster; the Y, HH cluster; and the F, S, R, Z cluster. Many new 
26 
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ideas, or aspects of existing ideas, were proposed and openly discussed in the 
market forums. 
In contrast to clustering the ideas based on a subjective assessment of the 
ideas and their relationships within product lines, we could consider grouping 
the ideas based on the buying patterns of the traders, grouping together those 
purchased by the same traders.  There appeared to be little correlation 
between these two comparisons as traders tended to favor one idea over 
another in a given product line.  For example, we examined the behavior of 
the traders as it relates to the ideas in the C, X, DD, I grouping and found only 
35%, 40%, and 25% of the traders who purchased shares in ideas X, DD, and 
I, respectively, also purchased shares of idea C. When comparing C to an idea 
on the opposite side of our product-line-based cluster, such as idea CC, 30% 
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Figure 4: Idea Clustering - Many ideas seemed to be stimulated by existing ideas 
in the market 
The highest overlap of traders was between O and S, where 12 (86%) of the 
14 traders who purchased shares of idea S were part of the 30 traders who 
invested in idea O even though these two ideas were targeted towards very 
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d. Founder's Behavior 
One of the most interesting analyses we performed on our market data 
involved assessing selected participants’ behavior. While it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to discern the intentions of a trader, the idea’s submitter (or 
founder) is clearly motivated to have his idea valued highly by the market, 
both by the funding given to the top idea as well as the smaller prizes given to 
the top three ideas.  There was also unstated potential for future funding 
opportunities as the market was run in conjunction with the business’s annual 
budgeting process.  The founders’ trading activity is summarized in Table 3.  
 
Symbol Submitter Price Prem Shares % tot vol Price Prem Shares % tot vol Price Prem Shares % tot vol Price Prem Shares % tot vol
A 125 89.4% 15        0.0%
B 169 136.7% 311 31.5% 87.5% 40 4.1% 116.3% 131      0.3% 101.4% 250      0.6%
C 51 109.6% 322 30.9% 0 0.0% 113.2% 550      1.2%
D 28 104.4% 648 27.9% 103.5% 450 19.4% 91.9% 171      0.4% 101.1% 734      1.7%
E 73 107.2% 110 11.8% 109.6% 118 12.7% 99.0% 1,608   3.6% 111.7% 1,928   4.4%
F 95 118.9% 68 5.8% 106.4% 60        0.1%
H 19 112.8% 763 36.1% 114.0% 358 16.9% 105.1% 334      0.8% 105.5% 917      2.1%
I 130 99.4% 40 5.4% 98.0% 55 7.4% 108.1% 2,793   6.4% 93.0% 4,458   10.2%
J 15 121.6% 50 6.4% 97.7% 130      0.3% 106.4% 195      0.4%
K 38 60.8% 15 0.9%
L 146 100.3% 54        0.1% 93.1% 15        0.0%
M 78 143.0% 5 0.6% 195.1% 15 1.8% 107.9% 352      0.8% 125.9% 280      0.6%
N 126 120.4% 237 34.4% 106.8% 598      1.3% 87.3% 1,183   2.6%
O 20 106.2% 261 25.8% 117.6% 240      0.5% 89.5% 623      1.4%
P 45 126.7% 485 33.4% 84.0% 140 9.6% 123.3% 250      0.6% 84.2% 775      1.7%
Q 87
R 62 91.8% 87        0.2% 97.9% 205      0.5%
T 154 129.5% 105 14.3% 120.7% 195      0.4% 93.8% 240      0.5%
U 48 104.6% 75 9.1% 84.9% 30 3.6% 109.9% 495      1.1% 96.3% 405      0.9%
V 8 87.4% 10 0.9%
W 105 102.1% 20 1.5% 88.9% 25 1.8% 106.0% 348      0.8% 93.2% 190      0.4%
Z 61 102.8% 74        0.2%
AA 130 136.3% 101 11.5% 101.1% 116 13.2% 108.1% 2,793   6.4% 93.0% 4,458   10.2%
BB 7 111.1% 25        0.1% 64.9% 43        0.1%
EE 4 122.3% 330 24.4% 96.4% 135 10.0% 125.0% 256      0.6% 91.9% 583      1.3%
GG 145 116.9% 31 4.7%
HH 159 147.2% 312 43.8% 115.3% 371      0.8% 94.3% 831      1.8%
II 73 115.4% 561 34.8% 106.3% 448 27.8% 99.0% 1,608 3.6% 111.7% 1,928   4.4%
JJ 130 111.3% 865 40.3% 99.8% 671 31.3% 108.1% 2,793   6.4% 93.0% 4,458   10.2%
KK 61 93.8% 15 2.1% 102.8% 74        0.2%
LL 85 100.8% 15 2.1% 102.0% 265      0.6% 116.0% 188      0.4%
MM 30 88.7% 45 4.6% 103.9% 278    0.6% 98.9% 245      0.5%
Sum 5,785 2,616 16,338 25,742
Vol Wtd Average 116.8% 102.8% 106.6% 97.2%
Other Ideas (not submitter's)
Sells






Table 3: Founder Trading Activity 
"Price Prem" means price premium, % tot vol is percentage of total 
shares traded for the idea by the founder. 
During the course of the market, a security's contribution to the player's 
portfolio was calculated as the VWAP over the last five days of trading.  The 
submitter column shows the trader id of the idea’s founder.  The price 
premium column shows the percentage of the five-day VWAP at which the 
founder bought or sold that idea or other ideas and the shares column shows 
the number of shares of that idea or other ideas that the founder bought or 
sold.  The volume weighted average row shows the volume-weighted average 
percentage of the five-day VWAP at which each founder bought or sold their 
28 
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29 
own idea or other ideas; it summarizes the overall price premium all founders 
as a group gave to their idea or other ideas.  Table 3 contains only those 
securities that were proposed and approved for inclusion in the market. 
In general, founders tended to buy their suggested ideas at prices above 
the VWAP in significant volumes.  They tended to sell at lower frequency and 
volume.  Founder activity with regard to other securities tends to fall into two 
categories: attempts to maximize the value of their own portfolio (buy low - 
sell high) or attempts to drive the prices of competing securities down at the 
expense of their overall portfolios’ value, often manifesting itself as a buy 
high - sell low strategy.  As an example, trader 130 took significant buy and 
sell positions in ideas FF (accounting for 11% of total trade volume), H (20% 
of total trade volume), F (16% of total trade volume) and B (37% of total 
trade volume) with what largely appeared to be an attempt to drive down the 
prices of these competing securities.  Similarly, trader 19 participated in 19% 
of trades in security C.  Overall, 29% of the traders were founders, and they 
were involved in 39% of all trades in ideas, including those that were not their 
own. 
A one-tailed two-sample t-test comparing the price premium for a 
founder's own ideas versus the price premium that founders placed on others' 
ideas showed that owners' price premium is higher for their own ideas than for 
that of others' ideas (t-statistic (df=38)=2.17, p=.018).  The difference 
between the founder's price premium when selling their own idea vs others' 
ideas is not significant (t-statistic (df=15)=0.43, p=0.67).   
In Table 4, we examine the behaviors of the top five and bottom five 
traders.  Those traders who were founders of ideas are denoted by the phrase 
"(founder)".  In general, we would expect top ranked traders to trade 
profitably, i.e., buying low and selling high. For all top traders except trader 
19, this appears to hold true. Conversely, we expect the lowest ranked traders 
to have been generally unprofitable, buying high and selling low. The bottom 
four traders were founders and the average ending portfolio value across all 
founders was $30,529 compared to an average of $32,556 for non-founder 
traders. The only founder in the top five was trader 19, who was able to 
purchase many shares of his idea early in the market and then take advantage 
of a large price run-up during the last week.  Trader 19 was the founder of the 
third ranked idea. 
In general, the founders exhibited a very different trading strategy than 
traders who did not propose ideas on the market.  This behavior could be 
considered a form of  'wishful thinking' as discussed by Forsythe.6 Forsythe 
found evidence in the Iowa Markets of behavior they termed 'wishful thinking' 
- the tendency of traders to perform irrational trades based on optimistic bias – 
thus making overly enthusiastic trades for preferred outcomes. 
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Trader Rank Price Premium Shares Price Premium Shares
23 1 91.0% 6934 109.2% 5929
22 2 93.2% 6100 108.8% 6249
19 (founder) 3 110.3% 1097 107.1% 1275
5 4 96.2% 3225 105.9% 3297
11 5 77.9% 698 127.4% 325
36 182 110.2% 438 86.2% 757
20 (founder) 183 113.0% 501 89.5% 623
45 (founder) 184 125.4% 735 84.2% 915
126 (founder) 185 110.9% 835 87.3% 1183
130 (founder) 186 111.0% 1937 94.7% 2328
Total 97.3% 22500 103.9% 22881
Buys Sells
 
Table 4: Behavior of Top Five and Bottom Five Traders 
Another likely explanation is that founders have another incentive in 
trading.  The reward associated with funding for the top idea introduces an 
externality that makes the behavior quite rational, even though it reduces a 
trader’s portfolio value.  It is also possible, that the monetary reward alone 
may not have been a sole motivator for the founders’ behavior as there may be 
a psychological or social benefit associated with being the submitter of a top 
idea (even in spite of the anonymity of the market).  This effect could be 
investigated further in future markets. 
The important question raised is whether markets can still perform 
accurately despite overly enthusiastic trading on the part of this biased subset 
of traders.  Despite this behavior, Forsythe asserts that the Iowa Markets 
produce efficient outcomes due to the effect of a few 'marginal' traders.  He 
asserts that marginal traders are heavily influential in setting market prices.  
They appear to have a sound assessment of the fundamental value of a 
security, trade considerably more than most traders, and submit limit orders at 
prices close to the market price.  Our market also had several traders who 
performed as marginal traders.  Traders 22 and 23 performed considerably 
more trades than other traders on the market.  Their trading was consistently 
rational as can be evidenced by the fact that these traders scored the highest in 
net worth at the end of the market.  Their trades tended to be in the form of 
limit orders around market prices.  
As an internal market, our market had considerably fewer participants and 
therefore less liquidity than in the Iowa Markets.  Given this, a single trader 
may have a larger influence than was found on the Iowa Markets.   Due to our 
lower participation, we may also have had fewer marginal traders to mitigate 
the effect of the biased traders.  Table 5 shows that several founders 
performed a large percentage of the trades on their securities. 
For six of the top ten ideas, the founder accounted for greater than 30% of 
all trade volume.    
30 
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D 98 2324 72 1098 47%
FF 98 1910 64
H 89 2113 58 1121 53%
Q 81 1082 57
JJ 80 2144 48 1536 72%
II 77 1614 50 1009 63%
F 73 1178 57 68 6%
HH 69 712 43 312 44%
R 54 1071 54
C 53 1042 54 322 31%
S 52 1165 56
KK 50 705 34 15 2%
O 50 1010 49 261 26%
EE 49 1350 52 465 34%
NN 45 1358 59
MM 44 980 55 45 5%
Z 44 475 30
E 42 931 50 228 24%
A 41 1215 53
P 40 1453 58 625 43%
DD 36 1265 59
LL 36 710 39 15 2%
W 36 1367 53 45 3%
BB 35 1691 57
I 35 741 37 95 13%
J 34 780 46 50 6%
N 34 689 41 237 34%
T 34 735 34 105 14%
G 33 819 54
X 32 974 52
Y 32 1205 50
CC 29 1035 54
AA 28 876 48 217 25%
V 26 1120 48 10 1%
K 25 1655 58 15 1%
M 24 832 43 20 2%
B 23 987 37 351 36%
U 23 827 44 105 13%
L 22 857 47
GG 21 655 40 31 5%  
Table 5: Founder Involvement in Market Securities 
One of the top ideas, FF, was one initially seeded into the market and 
didn’t have a specific  founder, but  subsequent  investigation revealed  that 
two  major traders  of  this  security  were  involved  with   thisproduct 
concept in its early stages and would benefit significantly from the award of 
the $50,000.  Statistically, there is a strong positive correlation between 
founder trade volume and final price (p<0.001 by linear regression).  The data 
also suggests that heavily traded securities with significant founder volume 
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tend to perform better, but significant founder volume alone is not sufficient 
to drive higher prices.  It is not clear to what extent this can be attributed to 
networking outside the market mechanism or herding behavior within the 
market.  It may even be coincidental that four of the top five ideas were both 
heavily traded and had a high degree of founder activity. Regardless, 
increasing participation would help limit the impact of founder influence; the 
more traders, the harder it is for any individual to shift security values (long 
term) in the market. It may also be that market exuberance for a founder's idea 
drives that founder to greater trading on that security. 
Another interesting phenomenon in this market was the strong 
competition that arose between the top two ideas.  The founders and interested 
parties of each idea were quite vocal during the market in pointing out 
potential trading improprieties of the other security (none of significance were 
actually found).  Prices of the two securities were highly correlated as seen 









































































































Figure 5: Price and Trading Volume for Securities D and FF 
 
2. PARTICIPANT SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Having witnessed behaviors in the market that could have influenced the 
results, we wanted to see how the market participants felt about the market 
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and its ability to accurately rank the given ideas. Clearly, an objective 
measure of market effectiveness is difficult, if not impossible to develop. To 
measure the real success of ideas requires business development and many 
years for sales and profits to be realized. To obtain a nearer term answer, an 
anonymous post market survey determined participants’ opinion of ranking 
effectiveness.  Due to the anonymous nature of this survey, specific responses 
of founders, or information regarding responses in relation to trader success is 
not available.  This is noted as an area for investigation with future markets.  
 
 
Figure 6: Survey Results on Ranking Effectiveness 
 
Since the market is being used to aggregate the opinions of the entire 
group, it is not at all surprising that the participant survey yielded mixed 
results when asked about the market's effectiveness.   
The survey results regarding the quality of the ideas were very positive, as 
shown in Figure 7.  The overall quality of the ideas surpassed other idea 
generation and brainstorming activities GE Energy has tried in recent history. 
Overall, in spite of the potential undue influence of founders, the market 
was successful in achieving GE Energy business objectives.   
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Figure 7: Survey Results on Idea Quality 
 
 
3. MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR FOUNDER’S 
BEHAVIOR 
 
Having run several successful Imagination Markets within GE, we had not 
encountered such zealous idea founders before. The founder behaviors 
described earlier have been detected in some of our other markets, but not to 
the extent that they could have influenced the outcome. Now that we have 
witnessed this interesting behavior in full force, what market design changes 
or other strategies could we utilize to limit the influence of this kind of 
behavior? 
1) Do not allow the founder to trade on his own idea: This option would 
unquestionably eliminate overzealous founder trading as it will change the 
trading motivation for founders.  We thought, however, that participants 
would be more motivated to suggest ideas and compare them to other ideas if 
they could trade their own ideas.  It would also not prevent friends or 
coworkers of the founder from overzealous trading on behalf of the founder.  
We can also reduce founder influence simply by not allowing the founder to 
sell any shares of their own security.  This would allow them to profit from a 
good idea but not to aggressively trade by repeatedly buying and selling the 
same shares.  However, the founder would not be able to sell any of his 
position (to buy another idea, say) if his idea’s worth fell a lot.  An alternative 
would be to limit the price for which the founder can trade.  This may entail 
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allowing founders to trade on their own ideas only up to a pre-defined price, 
such as $80/share.   
2) Capping the total amount of shares a given security can be owned by an 
individual trader: By capping the number of shares a trader can own of a 
given security, it prevents a single individual from owning a large percentage 
of the shares.  It does not, however, prevent a founder from repeatedly buying 
and selling the same shares in order to keep the price up. 
3) Capping the total amount of money that can be invested in a single 
security by a single trader: This would be similar to the effect of option 2 
above. 
4) Limit the number of shares a trader can submit for a limit order:  
Several founders were performing most of their trades by setting up very large 
limit orders at attractive prices.  For example, if the security were trading 
around $95/share, the founder would place a Buy limit order of $96/share for 
100 or more shares.  This would ensure that they keep the Buy price up until 
their limit order was exhausted.  By restricting the number of shares that can 
be placed as a limit order, and thus requiring them to spend more time 
reissuing their limit orders, we may be able to reduce the founders’ trading. 
5) Disallowing 'straddling' limit orders; or requiring the straddle have a 
minimum spread:  Founders were also able to keep prices inflated by setting 
high-volume buy and sell limit orders which straddled the current trading 
price and differed by only a few dollars.  Thus if the security was trading 
around $95/share, a founder would place an order to buy 100 shares at $94 
and sell 100 shares at $96.  This forced the price between these two thresholds 
until one of the limit orders was exhausted.  Once exhausted, the founder 
could then issue another limit order to reestablish the straddle.  Although 
similar to the behavior of a savvy trader playing fluctuations in the market, the 
founder's behavior differed in that their orders offered considerably more 
shares and had a tight spread between the bid and ask limit order prices.  By 
requiring that the difference between the buy and sell orders be at least $10, 
we can make it much more difficult for founders to have such a heavy 
influence on trading.  While it will not prevent their overzealous trading, it 
would likely reduce it.  This would be less of an issue with thicker markets. 
6) Eliminate motivation to zealously trade: Our market typically offers a 
reward for the best idea – either in the form of funding, or in the form of an 
opportunity to pitch the idea to the businesses leadership team.  This provides 
motivation to the founder to influence the price of their idea, including trading 
to keep the prices up.  As the purpose of the market is to identify and fund the 
best ideas, it is difficult to find a way to obtain good ideas without rewarding 
founders. 
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7) Reduce the amount of liquidity in the market:  We can prevent founders 
from taking huge losses in order to increase the value of their security by 
eliminating any excess cash and allowance given to the participants.  We 
suspect, however, that this would have limited impact since several founders 
on our market were so passionate that they liquidated their holdings in all 
other securities in order to raise cash to buy shares of their security.   
8) Allow short selling: We chose not to implement short selling in our 
market since users found short selling difficult to understand in early market 
prototypes.  As a result, traders have a limited ability to demonstrate that they 
feel a security is over-valued.  If a trader believes the fundamental price is 
lower than the current market price, they can only sell their shares.  Once 
done, that trader cannot further express his opinions through subsequent 
trades.  If we allow short selling, traders could continue to express their 
opinion that a security is over-valued; this may help offset the exuberant 
trading by the founder. 
9) Require founders to disclose their trades or all traders to disclose their 
trades once they buy more than some percentage of outstanding shares of an 
idea (similar regulations exist for financial markets).  We already allow any 
trader to look at the transactions log and see the entire history but we haven’t 
implemented any mechanism to alert other traders when a founder makes 
trades in his own idea or when any trader accumulates a certain percentage 
(note, however, that buying a lot of an idea’s outstanding shares should not be 
very feasible unless the market has unusually few participants). 
Finally, we should also acknowledge that restricting founders’ behavior 
might not improve market performance.  Presumably the founder of an idea 
knows more about the idea than other participants, so we may want them to 
play a big role. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Overall, the GE Energy business was extremely pleased with the results of 
the Imagination Market.  Funding was immediately provided to kick-start the 
two ideas tied for the top, and the business has decided to file patents for 
several others.  GE Energy plans to continue use of markets in the future.  The 
volume and quality of ideas compared favorably to brainstorming sessions, 
on-line suggestion boxes, and on-line discussion forums. One of the keys to 
success for using a market as a brainstorming tool is having an active and 
engaged trading population. Further work will be done to find more and better 
ways to encourage higher participation. 
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Incentives proved to be useful and the seed money prize for best idea 
helped convince participants that the market was a serious tool for idea 
generation.  The prizes for top performing portfolios may have caused some 
tournament behaviors, but they did help stimulate trading activity to improve 
liquidity.  Incentives for the top ideas contributed to “founder” behavior.  This 
behavior in of itself is not bad for the market, but care should be taken to 
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APPENDIX 1: INSTRUCTIONS TO TRADERS AND SCREEN 
SHOTS OF APPLICATION 
 
Upon logging into the Imagination Market application, the following 
instructions were given to market participants: 
 
The Imagination Market allows you to trade securities that represent 
the different product breakthrough ideas proposed by your colleagues. 
Like the ideas your colleague proposed to generate revenue?  Buy the 
idea’s stock with your Imagination Market bucks. Have your own idea 
that could contribute to the bottom line?  Propose it and if your 
colleagues buy in, your idea will be funded. The market aggregates 
the players’ opinions and provides a single measure representing the 
relative value of each security: share price….  
Each player begins with $3,000. Active players also receive an 
additional $1,000 each week. When securities (ideas) are added to the 
market, each player will receive 15 shares at no cost. During the 
course of trading, you can buy or sell shares on any given security. If 
you like a security’s idea, or believe the price is going to go up, buy 
shares from other players. If you do not like an idea, or believe the 
price is going to go down, sell your shares to other players. When the 
market is closed, each of your securities’ worth will be determined by 
the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) over the last five days 
each security was bought or sold. 
 
In addition to this short set of instructions, a 3-page instructional manual 
regarding specific examples of trading strategies, as well as Market Rules, 
were provided to market participants.  If you would like a copy of these 
documents, please contact the authors.  
The following screen shots illustrate the manner in which the market and 
securities were presented to the users.  Figure 8 illustrates the securities listing 
(idea titles have been replaced with ticker names for the purposes of this 
illustration).  Figure 9 illustrates the trading page for a given security 
(description removed and idea titles replaced with ticker name for the 
purposes of this illustration).  
 




Figure 8 - GE Imagination Market Trading Floor 
 
Figure 9 - GE Imagination Market Trading Page 
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